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Struggling Towards Coherence in Canadian Administrative Law? Recent Cases on 
Standard of Review and Reasonableness  
Paul Daly* 
Last year, Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick,1 was cited for the 10,000th time by a Canadian 
court or administrative tribunal. To put the number in perspective, Housen v. Nikolaisen,2 
the leading case on standards of appellate review, has been cited over 4,000 times 
although it was decided six years before Dunsmuir was handed down. Even allowing for 
the fact that my source is CanLII, which may not adequately cover the early 2000s, the 
difference is remarkable. Dunsmuir is cited roughly 100 times a month, 25 times a week, 
5 times a (working) day.  
And yet many of its features remain somewhat obscure.3 As Layh J. put it in Skyline 
Agriculture Financial Corp. v Farm Land Security Board, “locating the goalposts of 
correctness and reasonableness has remained an elusive target for those obliged to follow 
[the Supreme Court of Canada’s] leadership”.4 Similarly, Slatter J.A. chimed in: “The 
day may come when it is possible to write a judgment like this without a lengthy 
discussion of the standard of review. Today is not that day”.5 And Abella J. described 
standard of review as the “prodigal child” of Canadian administrative law.6 More 
recently, an appellate judge has taken the unprecedented step of posting on an open-
access website a 27-page “Plea for Doctrinal Coherence and Consistency” in the 
Canadian law of judicial review, which is referred to as a “never-ending construction 
site”.7 
Most of the academic commentary on Dunsmuir has been cautiously supportive, praising 
the changes the Supreme Court of Canada sought to effect but often suggesting that more 
may need to be done to develop a workable approach to reasonableness review. Audrey 
Macklin’s comment that on the whole Dunsmuir has made “[t]he job of discerning the 
appropriate standard of review…simpler”8 is probably representative, but the recent 
complaints from the bench and a judge writing extra-judicially suggest that any such 
early optimism is wearing thin.  
Indeed, a majority of the Court seems to appreciate the desirability of modifying the 
current standard of review framework. In Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada,9 Abella J. 
                                                          
1 [2008] 1 SCR 190. 
2 [2002] 2 SCR 235. 
3 See generally David J Mullan, “Unresolved Issues on Standard of Review in Canadian Judicial Review of 
Administrative Action - the Top Fifteen!” (2013), 42 Advocates’ Quarterly 1. 
4 2015 SKQB 82, at para. 35. 
5 Edmonton East (Capilano) Shopping Centres Limited v Edmonton (City), 2015 ABCA 85, at para. 11. 
6 Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. SODRAC 2003 Inc., 2015 SCC 57, at para. 185. 
7 Hon. David W. Stratas, “The Canadian Law of Judicial Review: A Plea for Doctrinal Coherence and 
Consistency”, Social Science Research Network, February 17, 2016. 
8 Audrey Macklin, “Standard of Review: Back to the Future” in Colleen Flood & Lorne Sossin eds., 
AdministrativeLaw in Context, 2d ed (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2013), p. 279, at p. 320. 
9 2016 SCC 29. 
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aired “in obiter” a “proposal” on how to “simplify the standard of review labyrinth we 
currently find ourselves in”, with a view to “starting the conversation about the way 
forward”.10 Four of her colleagues welcomed her “efforts to stimulate a discussion on 
how to clarify or simplify our standard of review jurisprudence to better promote 
certainty and predictability”.11 The dissenting judges welcomed the “constructive spirit” 
in which Abella J.’s suggestions were offered (although they “harbour[ed] concerns about 
their merits”).12 Only Cromwell J. firmly took the view that Dunsmuir should not be 
revisited, commenting that the standard of review framework “does not need yet another 
overhaul”.13 
Part of the difficulty lies in the attempt in Dunsmuir to set out a categorical approach to 
judicial review of administrative action. In doing so, LeBel and Bastarache JJ. found 
themselves swimming against a strong tide. The current of modern administrative law has 
long been pulling towards context. Gone are old categories – “quasi-judicial” and 
“administrative” decisions14 – which have been replaced by more nebulous concepts such 
as fairness and reasonableness which require courts to focus on various contextual 
factors.15 The attempt to impose a categorical framework to restore order was as doomed 
as it was noble.16 Sure enough, as I explain in Part I, context has returned to the forefront 
of Canadian administrative law.  
Another element is that the Supreme Court of Canada sometimes avoids standard of 
review analysis in whole or in part. The most egregious example is surely Febles v. 
Canada (Citizenship and Immigration),17 an immigration judicial review in which the 
standard of review was not mentioned so much as in passing, an omission all the more 
bizarre when viewed in the light of a spirited disagreement between Evans J.A. and 
Stratas J.A. in the court below on the appropriate approach to questions of international 
law,18 a disagreement which the Supreme Court acknowledged but did not deign to 
resolve in B010 v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration).19 But there are many others, 
some of which I will mention in Part II.  
                                                          
10 2016 SCC 29, at para. 19.  
11 2016 SCC 29, at para. 70. 
12 2016 SCC 29, at para. 78. 
13 2016 SCC 29, at para. 72. 
14 For a comprehensive treatment, see S.A. De Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (London, 
Stevens & Sons, 1961).  
15 See e.g. David J. Mullan, “Fairness: The New Natural Justice” (1975), 25 University of Toronto Law 
Journal 281; David J. Mullan, “Establishing the Standard of Review: The Struggle for Complexity?” 
(2004), 17 Canadian Journal of Administrative Law & Practice 59. 
16 See generally Paul Daly, “The Unfortunate Triumph of Form over Substance in Canadian Administrative 
Law” (2012), 50 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 319. 
17 [2014] 3 SCR 431. 
18 2012 FCA 324. 
19 2015 SCC 58, at paras. 22-26. 
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This paper is not intended to give a comprehensive overview of the post-Dunsmuir 
jurisprudence20 or literature.21 My modest goal is to analyze recent cases decided under 
the Dunsmuir framework with a view to determining where Canadian courts might 
usefully go next.  
My focus in Part I will be on the first step in the standard of review analysis: selecting the 
standard of review. Subsequent to Dunsmuir, the Supreme Court of Canada explained the 
required categorical analysis. Correctness applies to constitutional questions; questions of 
“general law ‘that [are] both of central importance to the legal system as a whole and 
outside the adjudicator’s specialized area of expertise’”,22 jurisdictional conflicts between 
two or more specialized tribunals; and “true” questions of jurisdiction or vires.23 
Meanwhile, the deferential standard of reasonableness “is normally the governing 
standard”24 for interpretations of a decision-maker’s ‘home’ statute or statute closely 
related to its function, matters of fact, discretion or policy and inextricably intertwined 
legal and factual issues.25  
Lurking on the edges of this new “analytical framework”26 were the contextual factors 
that formed part of the discarded pragmatic and functional analysis: statutory language 
relating to appeals or privative clauses; relative expertise; statutory purpose; and the 
nature of the question.27 These were retained in Dunsmuir and in Alliance Pipeline served 
to resolve “[a]ny doubt” whether the categorical analysis identified the appropriate 
                                                          
20 See especially Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Khosa, [2009] 1 SCR 339; Alberta (Information 
and Privacy Commissioner) v. Alberta Teachers' Association, [2011] 3 SCR 654; Newfoundland and 
Labrador Nurses' Union v. Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), [2011] 3 SCR 708; Catalyst 
Paper Corp. v. North Cowichan (District), [2012] 1 S.C.R. 5; McLean v. British Columbia (Securities 
Commission), [2013] 3 SCR 895; Canadian National Railway Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2014 
SCC 40. 
21 See generally, Joseph Robertson, Peter Gall and Paul Daly, Judicial Deference to Administrative 
Tribunals in Canada: Its History and Prospects (LexisNexis, Toronto, 2014). See also Paul Daly, “The 
Unfortunate Triumph of Form over Substance in Canadian Administrative Law” (2012), 50 Osgoode Hall 
Law Journal 317; Paul Daly, “Dunsmuir’s Flaws Exposed: Recent Decisions on Standard of Review” 
(2012), 58 McGill Law Journal 483; Andrew Green, “Can There be too Much Context in Administrative 
Law? Setting the Standard of Review in Canadian Administrative Law” (2014), 47 University of British 
Columbia Law Review 443; Robert E. Hawkins, “Whither Judicial Review?” (2009), 88 Canadian Bar 
Review 603; Gerald A. Heckman, “Substantive Review in Appellate Courts Since Dunsmuir” (2010), 47 
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 751; Louis LeBel, « De Dunsmuir à Khosa » (2010), 55 Revue de droit de 
l’Université McGill 311; Matthew Lewans, “Deference and Reasonableness Since Dunsmuir” (2012), 38 
Queen’s Law Journal 59; David J. Mullan, “Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick : Standard of Review and 
Procedural Fairness for Public Servants : Let’s Try Again!” (2008), 21 Canadian Journal of Administrative 
Law & Practice 117; Lauren J. Wihak, “Whither the Correctness Standard of Review? Dunsmuir, Six Years 
Later” (2014), 27 Canadian Journal of Administrative Law & Practice 173.  
22 Dunsmuir, at para. 60 citing Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79, 2003 SCC 63, [2003] 3 SCR 77, at 
para. 62.  
23 Dunsmuir, at paras. 58-61. 
24 Smith v. Alliance Pipeline Ltd., [2011] 1 SCR 160, at para. 26. 
25 Dunsmuir, at paras. 51-54. 
26 Alliance Pipeline, at para. 27. 
27 See e.g. Diana Ginn, “New Words for Old Problems: the Dunsmuir Era” (2010), 37 Advocates’ 
Quarterly 317. 
DRAFT, forthcoming, McGill Law Journal  
4 
 
standard.28 As I discuss in Part I, the precise relationship between categories and context 
remains uncertain and continues to cause confusion.  
In Part II, I will address the second step – application of the appropriate standard of 
review – though with an emphasis on reasonableness review, because its application is 
much more complex than the substitution of judgement permitted by correctness review. 
In Dunsmuir, Bastarache and LeBel JJ. offered an elegant definition of reasonableness as 
“a deferential standard” that gives administrative decision-makers “a margin of 
appreciation within the range of acceptable and rational solutions” but which nonetheless 
requires courts to inquire into “the existence of justification, transparency and 
intelligibility within the decision-making process” and into “whether the decision falls 
within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the 
facts and law.”29 Turning this definition into concrete guidance has proved difficult, 
however, and much ink has been spilled on “justification, transparency and intelligibility” 
and the “range of possible, acceptable outcomes”.30  
For all the confusion, perhaps we are edging towards coherence in the standard of review 
analysis. I will suggest that both in selecting the standard of review and in applying the 
reasonableness standard, context is reasserting itself. Moreover, it is reasserting itself in a 
way that has the potential to be consistent with the two principles said to hold the 
Dunsmuir project together, “the rule of law and the foundational democratic principle”.31  
The thesis of this paper is that the rule of law and democracy can and should now be used 
to guide the contextual inquiry required of reviewing courts, a contextual inquiry that 
would take the form of a flexible but robust standard of reasonableness review. 
Obviously, much has been said about these two principles as a matter of legal and 
political theory.32 Without wishing to sidestep important theoretical issues altogether, for 
the purposes of this paper I think it is sufficient to say that the understanding of these 
principles set out in Dunsmuir is relatively straightforward. On the one hand, the rule of 
law requires courts to ensure that statutory decision-makers “do not overstep their legal 
authority”.33 On the other hand, the democratic principle “finds an expression in the 
initiatives of Parliament and legislatures to create various administrative bodies and 
endow them with broad powers” and in order to respect legislative intent, the courts must 
avoid “undue interference with the discharge of administrative functions” duly delegated 
                                                          
28 Alliance Pipeline, at para. 29. 
29 Dunsmuir, at para. 47. 
30 See e.g. Paul Daly, “Unreasonable Interpretations of Law” in Joseph Robertson, Peter Gall and Paul 
Daly, Judicial Deference to Administrative Tribunals in Canada: Its History and Prospects (LexisNexis, 
Toronto, 2014); Paul Daly, “The Scope and Meaning of Reasonableness Review” (2015), 52(3) Alberta 
Law Review 799; John M. Evans, “Triumph of Reasonableness: But How Much Does It Really Matter?” 
(2014), 27 Canadian Journal of Administrative Law & Practice 101; Matthew Lewans, “Deference and 
Reasonableness Since Dunsmuir” (2012), 38 Queen’s Law Journal 59. 
31 Dunsmuir, at para. 27. 
32 See in particular David Dyzenhaus, “Dignity in Administrative Law: Judicial Deference in a Culture of 
Justification” (2012), 17 Review of Constitutional Studies 87, arguing that the two are not in tension at all.  
33 Dunsmuir, at para. 28. 
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to statutory decision-makers.34 The rule of law is firmly associated with the idea of 
legality, that reviewing courts have an important oversight role in ensuring that 
administrative decision-makers stay within acceptable boundaries, and the protection of 
important individual interests.35 Meanwhile, democracy means primarily that reviewing 
courts ought to respect the legislative choice to vest decision-making authority in bodies 
other than courts; administrative law doctrine should aim to protect the administrative 
autonomy accorded by legislatures.  
I will leave it to other work to consider whether these understandings of the principles of 
the rule of law and democracy are defensible in theoretical terms and whether they give 
courts or administrative decision-makers roles that are not normatively defensible. This 
paper has the modest goal of providing an overview of recent developments in Canadian 
administrative law, with some thoughts as to how the law might now move forward. The 
apparent loss of faith in – or at least frustration with – the Dunsmuir framework suggests 
that there is great wisdom in Matthew Lewans’ comment that Dunsmuir’s “enduring 
value…lies in its illustration of two persistent problems with judicial review”, namely the 
perennial attraction of jurisdictional error and correctness review, and the inability to 
articulate a reasonableness standard that is capable of consistent application in different 
contexts.36 In Parts I and II I take up the challenge of responding to those problems with 
the principles articulated in Dunsmuir in hand.  
This is not my first contribution to debates about the standard of review in Canadian 
administrative law. In a pair of essays published in 2012, I strongly attacked the decision 
in Dunsmuir and its subsequent application by the Supreme Court of Canada.37 My two 
lines of attack related to the replacement of context by categories and were neatly 
summarized in “Dunsmuir’s Flaws Exposed: Recent Decisions on Standard of Review”. 
First, “the categorical approach is unworkable and in fact a reviewing court cannot apply 
the categorical approach without reference to the much-maligned four [contextual] 
factors (or some variant thereon)”. Second, “the single standard of reasonableness is 
similarly unworkable without reference to some version of the four [contextual] factors”. 
I continue to believe that context is an inescapable feature of the modern Canadian law of 
judicial review. The analysis in Part I of this paper supports that argument. However, in 
Part II I build on my 2012 essays by proposing a means by which the contextual analysis 
can be cabined. Rather than casting courts adrift on a sea of context, I describe the 
instruments that they can use to navigate the vast seas of administrative law in a more 
effective and predictable manner. I have also assailed the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
efforts to apply the reasonableness standard to interpretations of law, arguing in 
                                                          
34 Dunsmuir, at para. 27. 
35 See e.g. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217, at paras. 70-78. 
36 Matthew Lewans, “Deference and Reasonableness Since Dunsmuir” (2012), 38 Queen’s Law Journal 59, 
at pp. 97-98. 
37 Paul Daly, “The Unfortunate Triumph of Form over Substance in Canadian Administrative Law” (2012), 
50 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 317; Paul Daly, “Dunsmuir’s Flaws Exposed: Recent Decisions on Standard 
of Review” (2012), 58 McGill Law Journal 483. 
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“Unreasonable Interpretations of Law” that the Court’s approach is analytically weak.38 
In Part II of this paper, I build on my earlier work by laying out an analytically robust 
conception of reasonableness review, one which draws its structure from the rule of law 
and democratic principles. 
Finally, I should acknowledge that, elsewhere, I have developed my own preferred 
standard of review framework,39 one which differs from the unified reasonableness 
standard I advocate below. There are, as Abella J. observed in Wilson, “many models” for 
standard of review analysis.40 Accordingly, this paper should be understood as an attempt 
to articulate a rational next step for Canadian standard-of-review jurisprudence, not an 
elaborate scheme developed from first principles.  
I. Step 1: Selecting the Standard of Review 
Several recent Supreme Court of Canada cases merit attention for their treatment of the 
question of how to select the standard of review. They signal two things: an obvious 
openness from the country’s apex court to the application of correctness review; and a 
return to context. These cases are the subject of Part I.A. Meanwhile, in Part I.B, I 
identify lower-court cases that employ contextual analysis and explore the implications of 
the reasoning there employed. 
A. Correctness and Context 
Tervita Corp. v. Canada (Commissioner of Competition),41 is a long, complex and 
important decision on competition law. It also contains a spirited disagreement between 
Rothstein and Abella JJ. on the appropriate standard of review of determinations of law 
made by the Competition Tribunal. 
The case concerned sections 92 and 96 of the Competition Act, in particular their 
application to a merger of companies owning secure landfills in British Columbia. 
Section 92 prohibits mergers that would lessen or prevent competition; this case involved 
prevention, because the acquired company had not yet begun to operate its landfill but 
would have at some point in the future. An acquisition by T, an incumbent, would have 
had the effect of preventing this. Section 96 provides a defence to the prohibition where 
the efficiency gains from the merger would outweigh its anti-competitive effects. 
The Competition Tribunal is a slightly unusual creature. Its membership is drawn in part 
from the judiciary and only judicial members are entitled to address questions of law.42 
Moreover, a decision it makes is appealable to the Federal Court of Appeal “as if it were 
                                                          
38 See also Paul Daly, “The Scope and Meaning of Reasonableness Review” (2015), 52(3) Alberta Law 
Review 799. 
39 See A Theory of Deference in Administrative Law: Basis, Application and Scope (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2012), chapters 2-4. 
40 2016 SCC 29, at para. 19. See also Dean Knight, “Modulating the Depth of Scrutiny in Judicial Review: 
Scope, Grounds, Intensity, Context”, [2016] New Zealand Law Review 63. 
41 2015 SCC 3. 
42 Competition Tribunal Act, ss. 3 and 12 
DRAFT, forthcoming, McGill Law Journal  
7 
 
a judgment of the Federal Court”.43 Rothstein J. acknowledged the ordinary presumption 
that interpretations by an administrative decision-maker of its home statute are entitled to 
deference. Nonetheless, the presumption was rebutted in this case, due to the presence of 
this unique statutory provision, which was evidence of “a clear Parliamentary intention 
that decisions of the Tribunal be reviewed on a less than deferential standard, supporting 
the view that questions of law should be reviewed for correctness and questions of fact 
and mixed law and fact for reasonableness”.44 
Abella J. disagreed. She would have applied a reasonableness standard. To do otherwise, 
in her view, would undermine settled expectations: “judges and lawyers engaging in 
judicial review proceedings came to believe, rightly and reasonably, that the 
jurisprudence of this Court had developed into a presumption that regardless of the 
presence or absence of either a right of appeal or a privative clause — that is 
notwithstanding legislative wording — when a tribunal is interpreting its home statute, 
reasonableness applies”.45 Rebutting the presumption in this case would “chip away” at 
the “precedential certainty” the Court had developed,46 because it would represent “an 
inexplicable variation from our jurisprudence that is certain to engender the very 
‘standard of review’ confusion that inspired this Court to try to weave the strands 
together in the first place”.47 She saw “nothing…that warrants departing from what the 
legal profession has come to see as our governing template for reviewing the decisions of 
specialized expert tribunals on a reasonableness standard”.48 
Abella J. is correct that Tervita will inject uncertainty into the law. Although the 
Competition Tribunal Act is the only piece of Canadian legislation that contains a 
provision requiring the appellate court to treat an administrative decision as if it emanated 
from an inferior court, it relies implicitly on a general principle that statutory language 
may rebut the presumption of reasonableness. Indeed, in Stewart v. Elk Valley Coal 
Corporation, , the Alberta Court of Appeal wasted no time in employing arguments 
based on statutory language giving a reviewing court wide remedial powers in appeals 
from human rights tribunals and creating an enforcement mechanism for tribunal 
decisions to support a conclusion that the legislature had “indicated that the Court and the 
Tribunal are dealing with ‘rule of law’ questions” for which correctness was the 
appropriate standard.49 It should be said, however, that the clause in the Competition 
Tribunal Act makes at best oblique reference to standard of review issues and could just 
as easily be understood as, say, guiding the Federal Court of Appeal in how to deal with 
the distinction between interlocutory and final decisions or remedial matters. 
                                                          
43 Ibid., s. 13(1). 
44 Tervita, at para. 39. 
45 Tervita, at para. 170. 
46 Id. 
47 Tervita, at para. 171. 
48 Tervita, at para. 179. 
49 2015 ABCA 225, at para. 55. 
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The post-Dunsmuir framework recognizes that there are certain categories to which 
correctness and reasonableness apply: but the categories are not self-applying, such that 
in hard cases – or maybe even all cases50 – courts must rely on contextual factors to 
determine which category applies. Then the presumption of reasonableness review was 
tacked onto the categorical approach without any explanation of how it might be rebutted, 
or of its relationship to the categorical approach. As Cromwell J. observed, “Creating a 
presumption without providing guidance on how one could tell whether it has been 
rebutted does not, in my respectful view, provide any assistance to reviewing courts”.51 
Does correctness review apply whenever a case falls into a correctness category, or only 
when the presumption has been rebutted, so that ‘rebutting the presumption’ is simply 
shorthand for the conclusion that a case falls into a correctness category based on a 
consideration of contextual factors? Or does an applicant have two bites of the cherry: 
one to get into a correctness category and another to rebut the presumption of 
reasonableness, presumably relying on contextual factors on both occasions?  
Gleason J. considered these issues in her comprehensive judgment in Pfizer Canada Inc. 
v. Canada (Attorney General).52 Gleason J. was surely right to say “the inquiry into 
standard of review does not necessarily end with the determination that the issue being 
reviewed involves the interpretation of the decision-maker’s home statute or a statute or 
regulation closely connected with its function and does not fall into one of the four 
foregoing categories to which correctness applies”.53 Both categories and context are 
relevant. 
The subsequent Supreme Court of Canada decision in Mouvement laïque québécois v. 
Saguenay (City),54  underlines the importance of contextual analysis, though in some 
respects it confuses the state of the law further. To begin with, Canada’s human rights 
tribunals have extensive powers to investigate and redress alleged breaches of 
fundamental rights by public and private parties. These statutory rights overlap but do not 
mirror the rights protected constitutionally; the human rights codes they are found in are 
usually described as “quasi-constitutional”. But Canadian courts have typically been 
cautious in allowing the tribunals to define the scope of their own mandates — especially 
the scope of protected rights — a caution that can be traced at least as far back as Canada 
(Attorney General) v. Mossop.55 Post-Dunsmuir, the situation has remained the same, 
either because the scope of fundamental rights is considered a question of general law of 
central importance to the legal system, or because the presumption of deferential review 
can be rebutted. 
                                                          
50 See Paul Daly, “Dunsmuir’s Flaws Exposed: Recent Cases on Standard of Review” (2012) 58 McGill 
Law Journal 483. 
51 Alberta Teachers’, at para. 92. See also Andrew Green, “Can There be too Much Context in 
Administrative Law? Setting the Standard of Review in Canadian Administrative Law” (2014), 47 
University of British Columbia Law Review 443. 
52 2014 FC 1243, at paras. 57-120. 
53 Pfizer, at para. 89. 
54  2015 SCC 16. 
55 [1993] 1 SCR 554. 
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The first strategy is found in an early post-Dunsmuir decision from Alberta: Walsh v. 
Mobil Oil Canada, using “existing case law” to justify selecting correctness as the 
standard of review.56 The second strategy can be seen in Canadian National Railway 
Company v. Seeley. Mainville J.A. found the presumption of reasonableness review had 
been rebutted, for several reasons. For instance, “labour arbitration boards, labour 
relations boards and superior courts” often address human rights questions, creating a 
“concurrent jurisdiction of a multiplicity of decision makers” which calls for correctness 
review.57 Also, the scope of discrimination on family status is a matter of concern across 
provincial boundaries. So, “for the sake of consistency between the various human rights 
statutes in force across the country, the meaning and scope of family status and the legal 
test to find prima facie discrimination on that prohibited ground are issues of central 
importance to the legal system…”58 One might be puzzled about why these factors rebut 
the presumption of reasonableness rather than indicate that the questions at issue fell into 
the category of questions of general law of central importance to the legal system, but this 
is further evidence of the uncertain relationship between categories and context.  
If anything, the confusion was exacerbated by Gascon J.’s reasons in the Saguenay case. 
The substantive aspects of the decision concerned the state’s duty of religious neutrality 
— violated here by a prayer read by the mayor of a Quebec city before municipal 
meetings. Ultimately, the Court upheld the conclusion of the Quebec Human Rights 
Tribunal that the prayer was an impermissible discriminatory interference with the 
freedom of religion and conscience of an atheist participant, a breach of the provincial 
human rights code interpreted by the Tribunal. It turned meetings “into a preferential 
space for people with theistic beliefs” whereas non-believers who participated faced 
“isolation, exclusion and stigmatization”, a breach of the “right to exercise…freedom of 
conscience and religion”.59 
Gascon J. identified an “important question” implicated by the Tribunal’s decision: “the 
scope of the state’s duty of religious neutrality that flows from the freedom of conscience 
and religion protected by the Quebec Charter”.60 Correctness was the appropriate 
standard of review of this question: “the importance of this question to the legal system, 
its broad and general scope and the need to decide it in a uniform and consistent manner 
are undeniable”.61 In addition, the presumption of deference applicable because the 
Tribunal was interpreting its home statute62 was rebutted: “the jurisdiction the legislature 
conferred on the Tribunal in this regard in the Quebec Charter was intended to be 
                                                          
56 2008 ABCA 268, at para. 55. 
57 2014 FCA 111, at paras. 47-48. 
58 Seeley, at para. 51. 
59 Saguenay, at para. 120. 
60 Saguenay, at para. 49. 
61 Saguenay, at para. 51. 
62 Saguenay, at para. 46. 
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non-exclusive; the Tribunal’s jurisdiction is exercised concurrently with that of the 
ordinary courts”.63 
This is confusing because post-Dunsmuir, a question falls either in a ‘correctness 
category’ or a ‘reasonableness category’. General questions of law of central importance 
to the legal system that are outside the expertise of the decision-maker under review is a 
correctness category. If a question is adjudged to fall into this category, that should be the 
end of the matter: correctness is the standard and it is up to the reviewing court to resolve 
the issue. Here, Gascon J. concluded — without explaining why: his conclusion was said 
simply to be “undeniable” — that the state neutrality question was of central importance 
to the legal system. If this is the case, there is no need to rebut the presumption of 
deference. Nonetheless, although there was no need to do so, Gascon J. went on to hold 
that the presumption of deference had been rebutted, because of the existence of 
concurrent jurisdiction: individuals can ask the Tribunal or a court to apply the Quebec 
Charter. 
This further muddies the already murky waters of the relationship between Dunsmuir’s 
categorical approach and context. In order to convince a court to apply a correctness 
standard, does an applicant now have to demonstrate both that a decision falls in a 
correctness category and that the presumption of reasonableness can be rebutted? Or is 
there just one step in the analysis, with the contextual factors used to determine whether a 
correctness category applies? Conceptually it makes more sense to think of a two-step 
process, relying first on the categories before turning to the contextual factors to confirm 
that the choice of category is appropriate – and, indeed, Dunsmuir envisages this sort of 
exercise.64 But this is not the route Gascon J. followed.65  
Gascon J.’s reference to the concurrent jurisdiction of the Tribunal and the superior court 
will doubtless give a new lease of life to the gloss applied to Dunsmuir by Rogers 
Communications Inc. v. Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of 
Canada.66 There, Rothstein J. wrote that concurrent jurisdiction can rebut the 
presumption of deferential review when a decision-maker is interpreting its home statute. 
Otherwise, “inconsistent” results could arise depending on whether a question of 
interpretation was raised at first instance (subject to de novo appellate review) or in an 
administrative setting (subject to deferential review). It had seemed as if the Rogers 
exception had been limited to its special facts: in Evans J.A.’s last set of reasons for the 
Federal Court of Appeal,67 he certainly took that view.68 Indeed, in Rogers itself, 
Rothstein J. said: “Concurrent jurisdiction at first instance seems to appear only under 
                                                          
63 Saguenay, at para. 51. 
64 Dunsmuir, at para. 62. 
65 See similarly Commission de la santé et de la sécurité au travail c. Caron, 2015 QCCA 1048, at para. 33. 
66 [2012] 2 SCR 283 (reaffirmed in Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. SODRAC 2003 Inc., 2015 SCC 57. 
67 Re:Sound v. Fitness Industry Council of Canada, 2014 FCA 48. 
68 See also McLean v. British Columbia Securities Commission, [2013] 3 SCR 895, at para. 24; Simser v 
Aviva Canada and Fsco, 2015 ONSC 2363, at para. 32. For another game effort by a Federal Court of 
Appeal judge (this time Gleason J.A.) to disentangle the many strands in a Supreme Court decision (this 
time Saguenay), see Canadian Human Rights Commission v. Canada (Attorney General), 2016 FCA 200. 
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intellectual property statutes where Parliament has preserved dual jurisdiction between 
the tribunals and the courts”.69 Evidently not! Context underpins the renewed 
significance of concurrent jurisdiction, though it bears noting that concurrent jurisdiction 
was not among the contextual factors mentioned in Dunsmuir. Plainly, in rebutting a 
presumption of reasonableness review, it is permissible to look outside the factors that 
made up the old pragmatic and functional analysis. It should be noted, however, that 
Rothstein J. insisted in Rogers that the basis for rebutting the presumption of 
reasonableness review was legislative intent, in other words, an invocation of the 
democratic principle. 
The confusion created by the Saguenay decision was entirely unnecessary, as there was 
unusual statutory language which would have provided a better route to Gascon J.’s 
conclusion. Decisions of the Tribunal are appealable, with leave, directly to the Quebec 
Court of Appeal. The relevant statute also provides that the general rules governing 
appeals are to apply in this context. The Quebec Court of Appeal has split previously on 
the proper interpretation of its role on appeal from the Tribunal: some judges have 
applied judicial review criteria (following the well-established rule that appeal clauses do 
not eliminate deference to specialized tribunals) but some have applied appellate criteria 
based on the apparently plain language of the statute.70 Gascon J. held that judicial 
review criteria apply: the Dunsmuir framework is the appropriate one.  
Nonetheless, one might reasonably think that the leave requirement is designed to ensure 
that matters of general importance should be addressed by the courts. One might further 
deduce from the legislature’s reference to rules governing appeals that a differentiation 
between questions of law (de novo review) and fact (deferential review) is in order. Of 
course, it has long been the case that the existence of a statutory appeal does not 
eliminate deference.71 But a general understanding that deference will often be 
appropriate even on appeals should not be transformed into a flexible rule that appeal 
clauses can never rebut the presumption of deference. All appeal clauses are not created 
equal. Surely the better route to Gascon J.’s conclusion would have been to rely on the 
unusual statutory language to rebut the presumption of reasonableness, as Rothstein J. did 
in Tervita. Certainly an ‘appeal with leave’ clause seems like a clearer manifestation of 
legislative intent with respect to judicial control of the administration than the unusual 
clause in Tervita. All that said, however, the later decision in Kanthasamy v. Canada 
(Citizenship and Immigration) seems to rule out the possibility that appeal clauses can 
ever be “determinative” of the standard of review:72 even a procedure whereby a first-
                                                          
69 Rogers, at para. 19. 
70 Saguenay, at para. 24. 
71 Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v. Southam Inc., [1997] 1 SCR 748. 
72 2015 SCC 61, at para. 44. See also Bell Canada v. Bell Aliant Regional Communications, [2009] 2 SCR 
764. 
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instance reviewing judge can certify a question of general law for authoritative resolution 
by an appellate court is not capable of rebutting the presumption of reasonableness.73  
This is not all. Gascon J. also segmented the question before the Tribunal into two 
separate parts. On the general question of state neutrality, the standard was correctness. 
But, “the question whether the prayer was religious in nature, the extent to which the 
prayer interfered with the complainant’s freedom and the determination of whether it was 
discriminatory fall squarely within the Tribunal’s area of expertise”, as did “the 
qualification of the experts and the assessment of the probative value of their testimony, 
which concerned the assessment of the evidence that had been submitted”.74 Clever 
lawyers will be licking their lips at the possibility of slicing decisions apart, extracting 
“general” or — an old favourite — “jurisdictional” issues for intensive judicial review. 
Abella J. was quite right to warn in her concurring reasons of problems to come. As she 
asked, rhetorically, “How many components found to be reasonable or correct will it take 
to trump those found to be unreasonable or incorrect?”75 
Treating the discrimination based on religious belief as bound up with the facts as found 
by the Tribunal is more consistent with current trends in reasonableness review and with 
the role of administrative decision-makers: as Abella J. put it in Moore v. British 
Columbia (Education), they are not Royal Commissions, but respond to particular factual 
situations.76 A deferential approach to judicial review is more respectful of 
the incremental, bottom-up development of policy to which administrative decision-
makers are well suited. In Saguenay, we are simply told that the state neutrality question 
is ‘undeniably’ of central importance to the legal system, without any explanation of why 
it is important outside the setting of the Tribunal and without any guidance as to how this 
category might be applied in future cases. 
No further guidance was offered in Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. SODRAC 2003 
Inc.,77 where Rothstein J. performed a standard of review analysis for five separate 
issues, applying a standard of correctness to one of them and a standard of reasonableness 
to the rest. The question whether broadcast-incidental copies form part of the 
“reproduction right” protected by s. 3(1)(d) of the Copyright Act was one of law that 
could arise before the Copyright Board or at first instance in enforcement proceedings 
and so, following Rogers, was to be resolved on a standard of correctness. This was 
predictable enough. Most of the other issues related to exercises of discretion or mixed 
questions of fact and law. In dissent, Abella J. said “this takes judicial review Through 
the Looking Glass”78 and in her separate dissent, Karakatsanis J. expressed the concern 
that Rothstein J.’s analysis “unnecessarily complicates an already overwrought area of 
                                                          
73 See also Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 1 SCR 982, at para. 
43. Cf. Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 SCR 817, at paras. 57-62. 
74 Saguenay, at para. 50. 
75 Saguenay, at para. 173. 
76 [2012] 3 SCR 360, at para. 64. 
77 2015 SCC 57. 
78 SODRAC 2003, at para. 187. 
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the law”.79 For Abella J., the possibility of segmentation represents a “new and 
regressive” step80 that effects a “significant and inexplicable change” in the law of 
judicial review.81 Rothstein’s reply — that this was all settled by the Saguenay decision82 
— is unconvincing, because neither there nor here is there any explanation of why a 
particular decision should be segmented (beyond the banal observation that one of its 
elements is general or legal in nature) or how a reviewing court should perform a 
segmentation operation. 
In summary, categories and context continue to exist side-by-side with little or no 
authoritative guidance on how they relate to one another. The possibility of ‘segmenting’ 
administrative decisions adds a further layer of complexity. In many cases, there will be 
no dispute about the standard of review, but as soon as there is, the problems with the 
Court’s approach to standard of review are all too apparent. 
B. The Return of Context 
Both Tervita and Saguenay demonstrate an openness on the part of the Supreme Court to 
correctness and contextual analysis. Unthinking application of the reasonableness 
standard of review is not to be taken for granted. Several appellate decisions indicate that 
lower courts have understood this message.  
A particularly clear example of the attraction of contextual analysis is Edmonton East 
(Capilano) Shopping Centres Limited v Edmonton (City).83 At issue was “whether an 
Assessment Review Board can increase a property assessment when a complaint is 
brought by a taxpayer seeking a reduction of the assessment”.84 For Slatter J.A., this 
question had to be answered by the courts: a standard of correctness applied. 
Slatter J.A.’s comment that “a mechanical and formalistic test for the standard of review 
is not reflective of the subtlety of the underlying issues”85 gives a flavour of his preferred 
approach. He provided six reasons justifying a correctness standard in this particular case, 
in particular, to justify his conclusion86 that the present case “presents either an addition 
to or a variation of the four ‘presumptive’ categories” of correctness review set out in 
Dunsmuir, a conclusion that, in its equivocation, is indicative of the confused state of the 
relationship between categories and context.  
First, the legislation provided for an appeal.87 Second, the appeal to the courts had 
“specific mandatory parameters”88 that commanded correctness review: in particular, 
                                                          
79 SODRAC 2003, at para. 194 
80 SODRAC 2003, at para. 188. 
81 SODRAC 2003, at para. 189. 
82 SODRAC 2003, at para. 41. 
83 2015 ABCA 85. See also Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Kandola, 2014 FCA 8. 
84 Edmonton East Shopping Centres, at para. 1. 
85 Edmonton East Shopping Centres, at para. 23. 
86 Edmonton East Shopping Centres, at para. 24. 
87 Edmonton East Shopping Centres, at para. 24. 
88 Edmonton East Shopping Centres, at para. 26. 
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where a case is remitted to the Board the legislation binds it to follow the directions given 
by the court. Third, the appeal is by way of leave, “a signal that the Legislature wishes to 
have questions of this sort reviewed by the superior courts, and the legislative intent is 
not fully realized without a correctness standard of review”.89 Fourth, statutory 
interpretation “is not the core of [the Board’s] expertise”.90 Fifth, taxation is special: “the 
existence of a right of appeal is in keeping with the general democratic principle that 
taxpayers are entitled to have their liability to the government determined by the ordinary 
courts”.91 Sixth, “multiple tribunals” are involved in the assessment process,92 which 
creates a need for judicial intervention to ensure coherence.  
Having “weighed and considered” all these factors, Slatter J.A. applied a standard of 
correctness.93 While one might not necessarily agree with each of Slatter J.A.’s 
justifications for correctness review, he surely mounted a formidable argument in this 
particular case, to which one can respond rather than having to read between the lines of 
his judgment. On the other hand, Slatter J.A.’s invocation of six distinct contextual 
reasons for favouring correctness review underlines the open-ended nature of the current 
contextual inquiry. And even if some of the factors, such as the presence of a statutory 
appeal, might seem to carry less weight in view of recent Supreme Court jurisprudence, 
the absence of any guidance on how to weigh competing factors and rebut the 
presumption of reasonableness review makes it difficult to describe Slatter J.A.’s 
approach or conclusions as wrong. 
With context so dominant, categories can never be as categorical as their supporters 
would like.94 Consider Commission scolaire de Laval v. Syndicat de l’enseignement de la 
région de Laval, 2016 SCC 8, where a school board had to decide whether to end its 
contractual relationship with a teacher, on the basis that the teacher had serious criminal 
antecedents. Having heard from the teacher, the executive committee of the board entered 
an in camera session during which it deliberated. Once its deliberations were concluded, 
the board issued a resolution removing the teacher from his position and providing some 
supporting reasons. 
Subsequently, the teacher’s union filed a grievance on his behalf contesting the dismissal, 
alleging for instance that the termination procedure in the collective agreement had not 
been followed. Notably, the collective agreement provided that a teacher could only be 
dismissed after “thorough deliberations” by the board. After the board had made its case 
to the arbitrator, the union called as witnesses the three members of the executive 
committee who had deliberated in camera. Ruling on the board’s objection, the arbitrator 
                                                          
89 Edmonton East Shopping Centres, at para. 27. 
90 Edmonton East Shopping Centres, at para. 28. 
91 Edmonton East Shopping Centres, at para. 29. 
92 Edmonton East Shopping Centres, at para. 30. 
93 Edmonton East Shopping Centres, at para. 31. 
94 See e.g. Andrew Green, “Can There Be Too Much Context in Administrative Law? Setting the Standard 
of Review in Canada” (2014), 47 University of British Columbia Law Review 443. 
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concluded that the testimony would be relevant in assessing whether the deliberations 
were “thorough”. 
The Supreme Court of Canada was unanimous in concluding that it was legitimate for the 
arbitrator to have the decision-makers testify. It was wrong to suggest that the decision-
maker’s motives were “unknowable”, a principle that “applies only to decisions of a 
legislative, regulatory, policy or purely discretionary nature made by public bodies”.95 
Here, the board was acting as an employer, a situation in which “the principles of 
employment law that are applicable to any dismissal” apply.96 Moreover, the principle of 
deliberative secrecy did not shield the members of the board.97 
However, the Court divided six to three on the standard of review. For the majority, 
Gascon J. applied a standard of reasonableness, on the basis that labour arbitrators are to 
be afforded deference on matters of procedure and substance falling within their area of 
expertise, it was “up to the arbitrator to apply the rule of relevance to the facts of the case 
in such a way as he or she deems helpful for the purpose of ruling on the grievance”.98 
That the arbitrator was applying general principles that can be applied in areas other than 
labour relations did not change this analysis, for their application “to a fact situation 
characteristic of a dismissal” did not “amount to a question that is detrimental to 
consistency in the country’s fundamental legal order”.99 
Côté J. disagreed. Deliberative secrecy, like professional secrecy, must be interpreted in a 
uniform and consistent manner across regulatory domains. It is a question of general law 
of central importance to the legal system and outside the expertise of an arbitrator: 
“Where the question relates not simply to the rules of evidence in general, but to the 
scope of such basic rules as those relating to the immunities from disclosure and 
deliberative secrecy, a court reviewing an arbitrator’s decision in this regard must be able 
to go further than merely inquiring into the reasonableness of the decision”.100 
This is further evidence that the categories alone rarely resolve the question of what 
standard of review to apply in difficult cases.101 The dominant considerations were, for 
Gascon J., the relative expertise and scope of authority of the arbitrator and, for Côté J., 
the essentially legal nature of the question. These, it goes without saying, are contextual 
factors external to the categories. Context matters even when it is not supposed to.  
                                                          
95 Commission scolaire de Laval, at para. 47.  
96 Commission scolaire de Laval, at para. 50. 
97 Commission scolaire de Laval, at para. 61. 
98 Commission scolaire de Laval, at para. 36. 
99 Commission scolaire de Laval, at para. 38. 
100 Commission scolaire de Laval, at para. 78. 
101 On this particular point see especially Paul Daly, “The Unfortunate Triumph of Form over Substance in 
Canadian Administrative Law” (2012), 50 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 317 and “Dunsmuir’s Flaws 
Exposed: Recent Decisions on Standard of Review” (2012), 58 McGill Law Journal 483.   
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Andrew Green has been probably the strongest and most sophisticated defender of the 
Court’s resort in Dunsmuir to categorical analysis.102 I think it is fair to say, however, 
that Green’s defence is lukewarm. He sees the “objective” of greater simplicity as a 
“move in the right direction”, but his analysis of Dunsmuir leads him only to say: “The 
categorical approach may therefore reduce some errors and have some beneficial 
systemic effects…”103 Moreover, although his institutionalist analysis sheds valuable 
light on the costs and benefits of categories versus context, it could be more alive to the 
doctrinal characteristics of modern administrative law. Green persuasively argues that 
courts will save time in identifying the appropriate standard of review by using categories 
rather than context. However, his focus is on the “institutional impact” of the categorical 
framework and “less about the application of the [reasonableness] standard”.104 The key 
problem is that context simply cannot be eliminated from judicial review:105 the attempt 
to remove it from the framework for determining the standard of review has failed (and, 
as I will demonstrate in Part II, context also seeps into the framework for applying the 
reasonableness standard106). Context is not quite everything in judicial review of 
administrative action, but it is everywhere.  
A way forward is suggested by the Federal Court of Appeal’s approach – implicitly 
followed by a dissenting group of three judges at the Supreme Court of Canada – in 
Wilson v. Atomic Energy of Canada Limited.107 The Canada Labour Code applies to a 
variety of enterprises falling under the authority of Parliament, i.e. federally-regulated 
entities. Section 240 protects some categories of employee from unjust dismissal. Wilson 
was dismissed without cause. He claimed he was unjustly dismissed for whistleblowing 
on his employer’s activities. It fell to an independent adjudicator appointed under the 
Code to decide. 
Unfortunately, there are two distinct streams of arbitral jurisprudence on a critical 
preliminary question. Some take the view that a without cause dismissal is per se unjust. 
Others prefer to say that the absence of cause is a factor to be taken into account in a 
global assessment of whether the dismissal was unjust. 
                                                          
102 Andrew Green, “Can There be too Much Context in Administrative Law? Setting the Standard of 
Review in Canadian Administrative Law” (2014), 47 University of British Columbia Law Review 443.  
103 See Green at p. 485. My emphasis. See also at p. 469: “There…is a trade-off between the benefits of 
justification (both for monitoring and for the lower court adopting the correct standard) and the costs of 
complexity in terms of mistakes”; at p. 477: the “complexity [of the contextual approach] may have led to 
biases in the form of review, either through mistakes or manipulation that was difficult to police”. My 
emphasis. 
104 Green at p. 447. See also the comments at p. 459 (“depending on [the reasonableness standard’s] 
content”) and p. 468 (“leaving aside the application of the standard”). 
105 Paul Daly, “The Unfortunate Triumph of Form over Substance in Canadian Administrative Law” 
(2012), 50 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 317 and “Dunsmuir’s Flaws Exposed: Recent Decisions on Standard 
of Review” (2012), 58 McGill Law Journal 483; Matthew Lewans, “Deference and Reasonableness Since 
Dunsmuir” (2012), 38 Queen’s L.J. 59. 
106 See also Audrey Macklin, “Standard of Review: Back to the Future” in Colleen Flood & Lorne Sossin 
eds., AdministrativeLaw in Context, 2d ed (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2013), p. 279, at p. 320. 
107 2015 FCA 17.  
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Stratas J.A. applied a standard of correctness on the basis that this was a general question 
of law of central importance to the legal system and outside the decision-maker’s 
expertise. Although the majority at the Supreme Court of Canada, per Abella J., applied a 
reasonableness standard on the now-familiar basis that the decision-maker was 
interpreting materials “within his expertise”,108 the dissenting judges applied a 
correctness standard. However, Côté and Brown JJ. made no attempt to justify their 
choice of standard in terms of the Dunsmuir framework.109 Bearing in mind the goal of 
articulating a rational next step for Canadian administrative law (rather than making a 
clean break with Dunsmuir), it is therefore useful to consider Stratas J.A.’s approach in 
some detail.   
To justify this categorization, Stratas J.A. invoked rule-of-law concerns created by the 
fact that adjudicators “do not consider themselves bound by the holdings on the other 
side”, with pernicious results: “Draw one adjudicator and one interpretation will be 
applied; draw another and the opposite interpretation will be applied. Under the rule of 
law, the meaning of a law should not differ according to the identity of the decision-
maker”.110 In my view, explained in greater detail elsewhere,111 Stratas J.A.’s concern for 
the rule of law should have been offset by an appreciation of the importance of decisional 
autonomy, something that follows from the democratic principle relied on in Dunsmuir; I 
agree with the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada that a reasonableness standard 
was appropriate in this case.112   
For present purposes, what is interesting about Stratas J.A.’s approach is that it relies less 
on categorizing the question at issue as a ‘general question of law’ than it does on 
contextual analysis. Stratas J.A. appealed not to categories but to the dispute resolution 
function performed by reviewing courts: sometimes, a question needs a uniform answer 
and, sometimes, a court will be the only one able to provide it. There is much to 
commend this approach. It replaces metaphysical musings about reviewing courts’ role in 
keeping decision-makers within their “jurisdiction” with an approach that builds on the 
judicial role in establishing uniform national standards on important matters of principle.  
Stratas J.A.’s approach also points towards a means of cabining the contextual factors: 
the two principles at the heart of Dunsmuir – the rule of law and democracy – can 
provide a framework for the identification of contextual factors. Insisting that contextual 
                                                          
108 2016 SCC 29, at para. 15. 
109 They did reference the rule of law at some length (para. 79 ff) but made no mention of the conception of 
the rule of law set out in Dunsmuir or of the democratic principle. Their preferred basis for employing 
correctness was the existence of “one conflicting but reasonable decision” (at para. 89, see also the 
reference to “discord” at para. 91), which would represent a new correctness category (as the majority 
explained at para. 17). However, Côté and Brown JJ. did not mention the Dunsmuir framework. Nor, for 
that matter, did they mention Domtar Inc. v. Quebec (Commission d'appel en matière de lésions 
professionnelles), [1993] 2 SCR 756, which remains a leading decision on conflicting administrative 
decisions. 
110 Wilson, at para. 52. 
111 “The Principle of Stare Decisis in Canadian Administrative Law” (2016), 49 Revue juridique Thémis 
757, at pp. 773-778. 
112 2016 SCC 29, at para. 15. 
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factors be drawn only from these principles would provide some structure to the 
contextual inquiry.  
Moreover, although the confused relationship between categories and context 
complicates matters, reference to the rule of law and democracy as guiding principles 
may assist judges who must navigate the morass of the standard of review analysis. It is 
possible to envisage an approach in which the Dunsmuir categories function as 
“signposts”,113 with contextual factors providing further guidance where necessary, 
without sight ever being lost of the need to justify the choice of standard of review by 
reference to the rule of law and democracy.  
In addition, as I will explore below, these principles can also assist in structuring 
reasonableness review, in which case the clear distinction selecting the standard of 
review and identifying the boundaries of reasonableness would break down, perhaps 
resulting in a single contextual inquiry that sets the ‘range of reasonableness’.    
Recognition of this possibility was evidently at the root of Abella J.’s intriguing 
suggestion, in Tervita, that the lines between reasonableness and correctness may soon be 
“completely erased”,114 a suggestion which became an “option” for future reform in 
Wilson.115 Contextual factors would still be important, but would operate only to 
determine the “range” of reasonable outcomes, thereby eliminating the confusion caused 
by the uncertain relationship between categories and context.116 
II. Step 2: Reasonableness Review 
Reasonableness is fast becoming the dominant organizing principle of Canadian 
administrative law; in Wilson, Abella J. suggested that reasonableness should now 
become the only standard of review. However, it needs to be properly understood. As one 
commentator has noted, “the Court continues to veer between two approaches to 
                                                          
113 Edmonton East Shopping Centres, at para. 22. 
114 Tervita, at para. 171. 
115 2016 SCC 29, at para. 19. 
116 For the moment, the categories are here to stay. It was suggested in SODRAC 2003 that one of the 
categories (true questions of jurisdiction) might be abolished, but a decision was deferred until the Court 
hears argument on the point, something it has evidently been waiting for since 2011: Alberta (Information 
and Privacy Commissioner) v. Alberta Teachers' Association, [2011] 3 SCR 654, at para. 34. Saguenay 
also contains a lengthy discussion of the Tribunal’s power to consider an ancillary complaint about the 
display of religious symbols in the municipal chamber (at paras. 53 to 62). The Tribunal is seised of matters 
after a review by the Commission, a screening body. Here, it was not properly seised of the legality of the 
religious symbols because there had been no preliminary review. Gascon J. accepted that the religious 
symbols could be taken into account in determining the overall character of the prayer but held that the 
Tribunal had no “jurisdiction” to rule on the legality of the display (at para. 156). Yet, no standard of 
review analysis was conducted of this question. Indeed, given that the jurisdictional limit is found in the 
Tribunal’s home statute one might wonder whether a standard of reasonableness should have been applied 
to the question of whether the Tribunal did have the competence to make a finding in relation to the display 
of religious symbols. Another example of the Court dealing with arguably a “true” jurisdictional issue 
without acknowledging it is Canadian National Railway Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2014] 2 SCR 
135, at paras. 34-49. 
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reasonableness review that are at opposite extremes”.117 I argue that contextual factors 
cabined by the rule of law and democratic principles – an idea introduced in Part I – can 
shape the content of reasonableness review.  
Courts of Appeal around the country have been putting flesh on the bones of the skeletal 
definition given in Dunsmuir. There, reasonableness was said to have two components: 
first, a decision-making process bearing the hallmarks of justification, transparency and 
intelligibility; second, a decision falling within the range of possible, acceptable 
outcomes in respect of the facts and the law. The florid language of the first component 
has been replaced by a more functional test which asks whether the reviewing court can, 
from the record and reasons provided, clearly understand how the decision-maker 
reached its conclusion.118 Satisfying this functional test is necessary to permit a 
reviewing court to assess the second component: for without a clear understanding of 
why the decision was reached and on what it was based, it is impossible for the courts to 
perform their constitutionally mandated function of judicial review.119  
As to the second component, there is always a ‘range’ of reasonable outcomes that “must 
be assessed in the context of the particular type of decision making involved and all 
relevant factors”:120 
In some cases, Parliament has given a decision-maker a broad discretion or a policy 
mandate – all things being equal, this broadens the range of options the decision-
maker legitimately has. In other cases, Parliament may have constrained the decision-
maker’s discretion by specifying a recipe of factors to be considered – all things being 
equal, this narrows the range of options the decision-maker legitimately has. In still 
other cases, the nature of the matter and the importance of the matter for affected 
individuals may more centrally implicate the courts’ duty to vindicate the rule of law, 
narrowing the range of options available to the decision-maker.121 
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118 See Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses' Union v. Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 
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As Gerald Heckman comments, it may be “that Dunsmuir has not really simplified the 
task of ascertaining the appropriate degree of deference, but has simply left it for a later 
stage in the analysis”.122 Indeed, at times the range of options might be very narrow 
indeed, especially where the Charter is involved. Consider Loyola High School v. 
Quebec (Attorney General).123 Quebec has a secular religious education course that is 
mandatory across the province, in public and private schools alike. An exemption is 
available “provided the institution dispenses programs of studies which the 
Minister…judges equivalent”. Loyola, a Jesuit high school in Montreal, applied for an 
exemption. It wishes to teach a religious education from (primarily) a Catholic 
perspective. The Minister refused the application, essentially because Loyola wanted to 
teach comparative religion and ethics from a Catholic point of view. He wrote, for 
example: “According to the summary of the program proposed by Loyola High School 
and transmitted to the department for evaluation, the program does not meet the 
requirements for the Ethics and Religious Culture program in terms of religious culture, 
as religions are studied in connection with the Catholic religion”. 
The Supreme Court of Canada split on how to review this decision. One might have 
thought that the analytical framework was settled by Doré v. Barreau du Québec,124 a 
unanimous decision written by Abella J. in which a deferential approach was preferred to 
review of discretionary decisions affecting Charter rights. For a majority of four judges 
in Loyola, Abella J. applied the Doré framework to the minister’s refusal to grant the 
exemption. Yet, without mentioning Doré, the three judges in the minority — including 
two who signed onto Doré —  applied a proportionality test. 
As for Abella J.’s application of the reasonableness standard, it is difficult to discern how 
it is more deferential than, or analytically distinct from, proportionality. She began by 
saying: “the task of the reviewing court applying the Doré framework is to assess 
whether the decision is reasonable because it reflects a proportionate balance between the 
Charter protections at stake and the relevant statutory mandate”.125 But she quickly 
added: “In the context of decisions that implicate the Charter, to be defensible, a decision 
must accord with the fundamental values protected by the Charter”.126 Indeed, “in 
contexts where Charter rights are engaged, reasonableness requires proportionality”.127 
Analytically speaking, the conclusions of the majority and minority were almost identical 
(though they disagreed on an important point about the teaching of ethical issues).128 For 
both majority and minority, the Minister’s inflexible position that religion had to be 
                                                                                                                                                                             
functional analysis to whether a decision was merely unreasonable or patently unreasonable. Based on her 
comments in Wilson, I think that Abella J. would be receptive to the approach set out in this paper. 
122 Gerald A. Heckman, “Substantive Review in Appellate Courts Since Dunsmuir” (2010), 47 Osgoode 
Hall Law Journal 751. 
123  2015 SCC 12. 
124  [2012] 1 SCR 395. 
125 Loyola, at para. 37. 
126 Loyola, ibid. 
127 Loyola, at para. 38, emphasis added. 
128 Explained by Abella J. at para. 71 et seq and on remedy, see paras. 164-165. 
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taught from a neutral perspective violated religious freedom and ran counter to the 
purpose of the exemption provision. A unanimous win for Loyola, little unanimity on the 
relationship between constitutional and administrative law, but clarity at least on the 
narrowness of the range of reasonable options open to a decision-maker who infringes 
upon Charter rights.129 
In other recent cases involving garden variety statutory interpretation rather than Charter 
issues, the Court has confirmed that, on some occasions there will only be one possible, 
acceptable outcome.130 
In general, the range of reasonable outcomes is determined by contextual factors drawn 
(it seems) from the rule of law and democracy principles invoked in Dunsmuir.131 On the 
one hand, statutory language (or the “rationale of the statutory regime”132) may restrict 
the range of reasonable outcomes, a nod to democracy, as might the importance of a 
decision to an individual, a nod to the rule of law. On the other hand, where a decision-
making power has been granted to an expert body or a politically accountable minister, 
the range of reasonable outcomes will generally be larger, because of the body’s 
institutional knowledge or the minister’s democratic credentials, and in some cases the 
legislature might have drawn the relevant criteria in generous terms, which further 
expands the range. Regardless, the boundaries of reasonableness are drawn in large part 
by reference to the rule of law and democracy.   
Identifying the range of reasonable outcomes is only part of the reasonableness analysis, 
however. It is necessary to develop the analytical structure of reasonableness to assist 
courts in determining why a decision falls outside the range of reasonable outcomes. Here 
again the principles of the rule of law and democracy are important. The rule of law, with 
                                                          
129 It is worth at least noting that, in some respects, the English courts have adopted a similar approach to 
reviewing the reasonableness of decisions. The most significant case is Pham v. Secretary of State for the 
Home Department, [2015] UKSC 19, where Lord Sumption noted that in recent decades, English courts 
have expanded “the scope of rationality review so as to incorporate at common law significant elements of 
the principle of proportionality” (at para. 105). There is now “a sliding scale, in which the cogency of the 
justification required for interfering with a right will be proportionate to its perceived importance and the 
extent of the interference” (at para. 106). In a passage reminiscent of recent Canadian commentary on the 
nature of reasonableness review, he said: 
It is for the court to assess how broad the range of rational decisions is in the circumstances of any 
given case. That must necessarily depend on the significance of the right interfered with, the 
degree of interference involved, and notably the extent to which, even on a statutory appeal, the 
court is competent to reassess the balance which the decision-maker was called on to make given 
the subject-matter…In some cases, the range of rational decisions is so narrow as to determine the 
outcome (at para. 107). 
130 Wilson v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles), 2015 SCC 47; Canadian Broadcasting 
Corp. v. SODRAC 2003 Inc., 2015 SCC 57; B010 v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 SCC 58. 
131 Compare Mills v. Ontario (Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal), 2008 ONCA 436, at 
para. 22, advocating “a contextual approach to deference where factors such as the decision-making 
process, the type and expertise of the decision-maker, as well as the nature and complexity of the decision 
will be taken into account” in which the link back to the rule of law and democracy is less clear. See also 
Canada (Fisheries and Oceans) v. David Suzuki Foundation, 2012 FCA 40, where reference is made to the 
separation of powers. 
132 Catalyst Paper Corp. v. North Cowichan (District), [2012] 1 SCR 5, at para. 25. 
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its concern for the maintenance of the precepts of the legal order, requires reviewing 
courts to police the boundaries of reasonableness. Equally, however, democracy, with its 
recognition of the decisional autonomy of the decision-maker chosen by the legislature to 
regulate a particular area, imposes important restraints on the type of analysis a reviewing 
court may legitimately conduct. 
A. How to Do Reasonableness Review 
There is a fascinating review of Canadian administrative law on reasonableness in 
Workplace Health, Safety and Compensation Commission v. Allen.133 A received benefits 
for a workplace injury. These benefits were capped at 80% of actual earnings. A then 
retired and was to receive benefits “equal” to the pension he would have received. The 
Commission sought to cap the pension at 80% as well. A took a different view but lost in 
the administrative process. He won, however, on judicial review; the first-instance judge 
and Court of Appeal both concluded that there was only one reasonable outcome, that 
benefits could not be capped. 
Building on the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Newfoundland Nurses, the 
Commission argued that administrative decisions should be presumed correct. Barry J.A. 
rejected the suggestion that there was any presumption of correctness of administrative 
decisions. If anything, there is a presumption of validity that places an “onus” on an 
applicant “to point to some reason, whether stemming from the facts or the words of the 
statute to question the reasonableness of the tribunal’s interpretation”, for which the 
decision-maker must provide “sufficient justification” in the form of “a convincing 
explanation why its choice of meanings was reasonable.134 
Along similar lines, as least as far as the structure of reasonableness review is concerned, 
is Delios v. Canada (Attorney General),135 a straightforward review of a labour 
adjudicator’s interpretation of a collective agreement. First, Stratas J.A. noted, although 
the reviewing court nominally applied a standard of reasonableness, it had “actually 
performed correctness review”.136 Reasonableness review does not permit a court to 
arrive at its own preferred interpretation of a provision and then check to see whether the 
administrative decision-maker’s interpretation matches it: “as reviewing judges, we do 
not make our own yardstick and then use that yardstick to measure what the administrator 
did, finding any inconsistency to be unreasonable”. That would be disguised correctness 
review, “the court developing, asserting and enforcing its own view of the matter – 
correctness review”.137 Second, Stratas J.A. recalled the now-familiar idea that the range 
                                                          
133 2014 NLCA 42. 
134 Allen, at paras. 41-42. Barry J.A. also quoted (see paras. 67-69) generously from Paul Daly, 
“Unreasonable Interpretations of Law” in Joseph Robertson, Peter Gall and Paul Daly, Judicial Deference 
to Administrative Tribunals in Canada: Its History and Future (Lexis Nexis, Toronto, 2014)). Although 
Rowe J.A. refused to endorse these paragraphs, he did endorse the discussion just cited, which paraphrases 
the essence of the argument in the paper from which Barry J.A. quoted. 
135 2015 FCA 117. 
136 Delios, at para. 25; and see the very instructive examples at para. 23. 
137 Delios, at para. 28. 
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of acceptable and defensible outcomes “can be narrow, moderate or wide according to the 
circumstances”138 before adding, in a passage that needs to be quoted at length: 
The evidentiary record, legislation and case law bearing on the problem, judicial 
understandings of the rule of law and constitutional standards help to inform 
acceptability and defensibility. Here, certain indicators, sometimes called “badges 
of unreasonableness,” may assist…For example, a decision whose effects appear 
to conflict with the purpose of the provision under which the administrator is 
operating may well raise an apprehension of unreasonableness…In that sort of 
case, the quality of the explanations given by the administrator in its reasons on 
that point may matter a great deal. Another badge of unreasonableness is the 
making of key factual findings with no rational basis or entirely at odds with the 
evidence. But care must be taken not to allow acceptability and defensibility in the 
administrative law sense to reduce itself to the application of rules founded upon 
badges. Acceptability and defensibility is a nuanced concept informed by the real-
life problems and solutions recounted in the administrative law cases, not a 
jumble of rough-and-ready, hard-and-fast rules.139  
Badges of unreasonableness must be identified in order to justify striking down a 
decision, as the analyses in Allen and Delios indicate. Notably, the indicia of 
unreasonableness can be drawn from the same sources as the contextual factors that make 
up the range of reasonable outcomes: inconsistent decisions, for instance, sound in the 
rule of law;140 whereas decisions that fail to take into account important statutory 
language do violence to the democratic principle.141 And in general, ensuring that 
decisions respect the fundamental precepts of the legal system is a means of upholding 
the rule of law.  
But this is not a laundry list of potential reasons for judicial intervention. Sometimes, 
perhaps even often, what look like badges of unreasonableness on first glance will turn 
out on a patient review of the record to be perfectly acceptable and defensible ways of 
expressing a particular thought or justifying a particular conclusion.142 
Where a decision is indelibly tainted by a badge or badges of unreasonableness, judicial 
intervention will be more or less appropriate depending on the range of reasonable 
outcomes. For instance, the narrower the range, the more that will be required by way of 
explanation of the badge(s) of unreasonableness tainting the decision. Conversely, the 
wider the range, the less a reviewing court should require by way of explanation. In 
                                                          
138 Delios, at para. 26. 
139 Delios, at para. 27. 
140 See e.g. Wilson, above. 
141 See e.g. Allen, above and Corporation d’Urgences-santé c. Syndicat des employées et employés 
d’Urgences-santé (CSN), 2015 QCCA 315. 
142 See e.g. Saskatchewan Power Corporation v Alberta (Utilities Commission), 2015 ABCA 183, at para. 
57: “We do not read these paragraphs as conflicting to the degree advanced by the appellants”. 
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searching for these explanations, an administrative decision should be read fairly, not 
picked apart in a “line by line treasure hunt for error”.143  
To summarize: if the same contextual factors that are relevant to choosing the standard of 
review are also relevant to determining the range of reasonable outcomes, Canadian law 
has, despite everything, come a long way towards achieving coherence in the standard of 
review and, perhaps, towards an all-encompassing flexible reasonableness standard that 
restricts extremely narrowly or expands very broadly depending on the interplay of the 
rule of law and democracy in a given case.  
This would avoid altogether the problematic relationship between categories and context 
described above. And it would not necessarily raise constitutional difficulties by 
eliminating correctness review. In Alberta Teachers’ Cromwell J. argued that the 
“constitutional guarantee” of judicial review144 “does not merely assure judicial review 
for reasonableness; it guarantees jurisdictional review on the correctness standard”.145 
Abella J. had a strong response to this argument in Wilson: 
Nothing Dunsmuir says about the rule of law suggests that constitutional 
compliance dictates how many standards of review are required. The only 
requirement, in fact, is that there be judicial review in order to ensure, in 
particular, that decision-makers do not exercise authority they do not have.  I see 
nothing in its elaboration of rule of law principles that precludes the adoption of a 
single standard of review, so long as it accommodates the ability to continue to 
protect both deference and the possibility of a single answer where the rule of law 
demands it, as in the four categories singled out for correctness review 
in Dunsmuir.146 
More generally, reasonableness review, guided by the rule of law and democracy, is not 
“unduly deferential”.147 And if the range of reasonable answers will sometimes be so 
narrow as to admit of only one possible, acceptable outcome, this ensures that the 
constitutional guarantee of judicial review is more than an “empty shell”;148 in some 
cases, it will shade into correctness review, but without engendering endless confusion 
between categories and context. Doing away with this confusion would save litigants and 
courts precious resources and thus have its own rule-of-law and, indeed, access-to-justice 
advantages. 
B. How Not to Do Reasonableness Review  
These intelligent efforts to explain and structure the reasonableness inquiry can be 
contrasted with the less impressive guidance from the Supreme Court of Canada. As 
                                                          
143 Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada, Local 30 v. Irving Pulp & Paper, Ltd., 
[2013] 2 SCR 458, at para. 54. 
144 Crevier v. Attorney General of Quebec, [1981] 2 SCR 220. 
145 Alberta Teachers’, at para. 103. 
146 2016 SCC 29, at para. 31. 
147 Maritime Broadcasting System Limited v. Canadian Media Guild, 2014 FCA 59, at para. 57. 
148 Alberta Teachers’, at para. 103. 
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Professor Mullan has recently suggested, “If the whole standard of review enterprise is 
not to fall further into disrepute, the Supreme Court of Canada needs to articulate more 
fully a template for the conduct of proper or appropriate deferential reasonableness 
review and to condemn disguised correctness review in all of its various forms”.149 
One case is used here for the purposes of comparison, but many others could be singled 
out. In general, these are decisions in which the language of reasonableness performs a 
primarily rhetorical function while the Court applies a form of review that treats the 
administrative decision as a decorative ornament rather than the considered position of 
the legislature’s designated decision-maker.150 The Court has understood this in the past. 
Iacobucci J. concisely explained – in part by reference to the democratic principle – the 
analytical structure of reasonableness review in Law Society of New Brunswick v. 
Ryan.151 First, “a court should not at any point ask itself what the correct decision would 
have been” because the administrative decision-maker, not the court, has been assigned 
by the legislature “the primary responsibility of deciding the issue according to its own 
process and for its own reasons”.152 Building on this invocation of the democratic 
principle, Iacobucci J. warned: “[e]ven if there could be, notionally, a single best answer, 
it is not the court’s role to seek this out when deciding if the decision was 
unreasonable”.153 
Although the following discussion is primarily analytical, it is underscored by the 
democratic principle. A legislative choice to designate a decision-maker other than a 
court as regulator of a specified area should be respected. At the same time, upholding 
the rule of law requires courts to keep a check on the rationality of administrative 
decision-making. Applying the reasonableness standard appropriately is the primary way 
for Canadian courts to respect legislative choices to grant decision-making autonomy to 
administrative bodies.154   
                                                          
149 See David J. Mullan, “2015 Developments in Administrative Law Relevant to Energy Law and 
Regulation” (2016), 4(1) Energy Regulation Quarterly, available online: 
http://www.energyregulationquarterly.ca/articles/2015-developments-in-administrative-law-relevant-to-
energy-law-and-regulation#sthash.kdNpH500.8UHTYrEZ.dpbs 
150 See e.g. Martin v. Alberta (Workers’ Compensation Board), 2014 SCC 25; Ontario (Community Safety 
and Correctional Services) v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2014 SCC 31; Quebec 
(Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Bombardier Inc. (Bombardier 
Aerospace Training Center), 2015 SCC 39; Wilson v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor 
Vehicles), 2015 SCC 47; Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. SODRAC 2003 Inc., 2015 SCC 57; B010 v. 
Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 SCC 58; Wilson v. Atomic Energy Agency of Canada Ltd, 
2016 SCC 29. 
151  [2003] 1 SCR 247. 
152 Ryan, at para. 50. 
153 Ryan, at para. 51. 
154 As a result, and despite my suggestion to the contrary in “The Scope and Meaning of Reasonableness 
Review” (2015), 52(3) Alberta Law Review 799, at pp. 824-825, I think it is wrong to say that a narrow 
range of reasonable outcomes – even one that recognizes only one reasonable outcome – is the functional 
equivalent of correctness review. Correctness review permits the reviewing court to step into the shoes of 
the administrative decision-maker, whereas reasonableness review (properly applied) requires a reviewing 
court to begin with the administrative decision and carefully demonstrate why it is unreasonable. 
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The province of Quebec allows pregnant workers to exercise a right of withdrawal from 
dangerous work environments. At issue in Dionne v. Commission scolaire des 
Patriotes,155 was a supply teacher’s thwarted effort to exercise her right of withdrawal. A 
unanimous Supreme Court of Canada quashed the decision of the Commission des lésions 
professionnelles and held that teacher was entitled to withdraw. 
Although it may seem unusual to treat schools as dangerous workplaces, it is common 
and accepted practice in Quebec for pregnant teachers to withdraw from the workplace 
because of the risk of contracting harmful diseases from their students. Reading between 
the lines of the present case, the school board and the CLP apparently took umbrage at 
the teacher’s temerity in claiming her statutory rights, evidence perhaps of a disconnect 
between law-in-the-books and law-in-practice and lingering discomfort amongst 
employers about assertive employees. 
Be that as it may, the most interesting aspect of the case, from an administrative-law 
point of view, lies in the differing approaches to the task of judicial review taken by the 
appellate judges involved. In my view, the Quebec Court of Appeal’s stance was more 
appropriate than that of the Supreme Court of Canada. And of the Quebec Court of 
Appeal judges, the dissenting reasons of Dalphond J.A. are preferable. 
 
First, the facts. Dionne was a qualified teacher. But she did not have a permanent contract 
of employment. As a supply teacher, she was contacted on a regular basis by the school 
board and filled in as requested. Once she learned that she was pregnant, she responded 
to offers from the school board by saying she would be happy to teach but that she would 
have to exercise her right to withdraw due to her pregnancy. 
All agree that when a supply teacher agrees to teach for a particular period of time, a 
contract is formed between the teacher and the school board. The question was whether, 
in light of her desire to exercise her right of withdrawal, D was a “worker” for the 
purposes of the Act respecting occupational safety, ss. 40-48 of which provide for the 
right of withdrawal and associated rights. Properly speaking, the right is to be re-assigned 
to other activities that are not dangerous, with a right to withdraw, with benefits, if no re-
assignment is offered by the employer. 
In the Supreme Court, Abella J. made only fleeting reference to the decision under 
review. She engaged in an analysis of the text and purpose of the statutory provisions at 
issue, concluding156 that the legislation “protects pregnant women in two significant 
ways: it protects their health by substituting safe tasks for dangerous ones, and it protects 
their employment by providing financial and job security”. She mentioned and criticized 
the CLP’s conclusion that Dionne could not be treated as a “worker” because her inability 
to go to the workplace frustrated the creation of a contract of employment. The whole 
point of the scheme, in Abella J.’s view was “to protect pregnant workers who have a 
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contract to work”, in which case “[i]t would be anomalous, to say the least, to use the 
legislated right of a pregnant worker to withdraw from an unsafe workplace to conclude 
that her withdrawal negates the formation of the contract of employment…”157 Thus, 
Abella J. continued, as soon as Dionne had accepted the offer, she became a “worker” 
within the meaning of the statute: “Her pregnancy was not an incapacity that prevented 
her from performing the work, it was the dangerous workplace, and that in turn triggered 
her statutory right to substitute that work with a safe task or withdraw”.158  
This was the core of Abella J.’s reasoning and justified her conclusion that the CLP’s 
decision was unreasonable. The thrust of Abella J.’s analysis was that the CLP should 
have answered the question before it in a particular way. Passing references to 
unreasonableness159 cannot obscure the fact that Abella J. essentially stepped into the 
shoes of the CLP and rendered what she thought was the most appropriate decision in the 
circumstances. Reading the judgment from start to finish, one could be forgiven for 
thinking the Supreme Court was sitting in an appellate capacity, rather than conducting a 
judicial review. 
Contrast this approach with that of Dalphond J.A., dissenting in the Quebec Court of 
Appeal.160 Both Dalphond J.A. and Abella J. reached the same result, but by very 
different means. Dalphond J.A. began with the decision of the CLP, underlining its 
central elements: 
Partant, pour qu’il y ait formation d’un nouveau contrat, il faut que la personne 
soit en mesure de s’obliger à effectuer un travail sous la subordination d’un 
employeur et qu’elle soit rémunérée en conséquence, selon les termes de l’article 
2085C.c.Q.  
Le tribunal ne peut donc partager l’opinion de la procureure de madame Dionne 
quand elle allègue qu’une seule offre de suppléance acceptée par madame Dionne 
entraîne la formation d’un contrat. En effet, il manque une cause essentielle à ce 
contrat, soit une prestation de travail. Ainsi, les dix fois, en novembre 2006, où 
madame Dionne accepte une offre de suppléance, il n’y a pas formation de contrat 
puisque aucune prestation de travail n’est offerte ou ne peut être offerte par 
elle…161  
Plainly, the CLP’s conclusion was based on the absence of a contract between the parties. 
Dalphond J.A. went on to examine the text and purpose of the legislation, but primarily to 
provide context for his conclusion that the CLP’s position was contrary to the text and 
purpose of the law.162 
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He gave three reasons why the CLP’s decision was unreasonable. First, the CLP’s own 
logic supported the conclusion that offer and acceptance of occasional work triggered the 
right to withdrawal and related provisions, but the school board had made no effort to 
give Dionne other tasks, such as correcting work or dealing with small groups of 
students.163 Second, for the CLP to deny that a contract had been created was contrary to 
its own factual conclusions and the evidence in the record.164 Third, the CLP’s position 
was irrational, because it placed teachers like Dionne in an invidious position of choosing 
between potential harm to their child and the loss of statutory benefits.165  
Dalphond J.A.’s approach is notable because he carefully examined the reasons given for 
the administrative decision and, by demonstrating their internal inconsistencies and 
irrational effects, justified his decision to intervene. Rather than establishing an external 
benchmark based on his examination of the law and the facts against which to judge the 
decision, as Abella J. did, he worked from within the decision to demonstrate why it was 
untenable. Whereas Abella J. asserted166 that, based on the evidence, there was no 
contract, Dalphond J.A. preferred to say that the CLP’s own conclusion was that there 
was a contract and that its refusal to recognize this led to perverse results. 
III. Conclusion 
In the wake of the recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions on standard of review, 
discussed in Part I, it seems fair to say that both correctness and context are firmly in 
vogue. Lower courts have already fastened onto these decisions to justify more 
contextual approaches to selecting the standard of review and to applying a correctness 
standard. 
Given that the Supreme Court has not yet been clear on the precise relationship between 
categories and context, or the contextual factors to which reviewing courts might 
legitimately have regard, there is reason to fear that Tervita and Saguenay might create 
confusion in Canadian administrative law.  However, the Federal Court of Appeal 
decision in Wilson and Abella J.’s obiter comments on appeal indicate that the contextual 
factors may be confined by the two principles said to underlie the Dunsmuir framework: 
the rule of law and democracy. Hopefully, in future cases, courts will explain how the 
contextual factors relied upon relate to these core principles. Otherwise, unfortunately, 
the law will become more confused.  
One might quibble that this simply represents “the bold innovations of a traffic engineer 
that in the end do no more than shift rush hour congestion from one road intersection to 
another without any overall saving to motorists in time or expense”.167 However, it is 
better “to adapt the framework of judicial review to varying circumstances and different 
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kinds of administrative actors than it is to go through the same checklist of factors in 
every case, whether or not they are pertinent”.168  
Another reason to hope that these principles come to structure the standard of review 
inquiry is that they are already influential in applying the reasonableness standard 
discussed in Part II. In particular, the range of reasonable outcomes can be determined by 
reference to contextual factors drawn from the rule of law and democratic principles, and 
the indicia of unreasonableness that must be identified to justify judicial intervention also 
sound in these underlying principles. Recognizing the conceptual unity between the task 
of selecting the standard of review and applying reasonableness points the way to a 
further simplification of the Dunsmuir framework: collapsing the correctness and 
reasonableness standards into one range of permissible outcomes that expands or 
contracts depending on contextual factors. 
But attention must also be paid to the analytical structure of reasonableness review. If 
reasonableness is not applied in a way that is respectful of the democratic principle 
embodied in the legislative choice to grant decision-making authority to a body other 
than a court, confusion lies ahead. Hopefully, 10,000 more citations to Dunsmuir from 
now, Canadian courts will have achieved the greater degree of conceptual clarity that 
now seems possible. 
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